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CLERK SUPREME COURT (801) 322-9146
UTAH

Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Re:

Braithwaite v . West Valley City
Supreme Court Case No. 900209
Citation of Supplemental Authority

Dear Mr, Butler:
In accordance with Rule 24(0), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
defendant-respondent, West Valley City Corporation, brings to the Court f s
attention the following supplemental authorities:
1.
Duncan v . Union Pacific Railroad Company and the State of Utah,
Supreme Court No 900233, decided by the Utah Supreme Court on April 6, 1992.
That case deals with the issue of whether the governmental entity f s activities
in question are "governmental" and "discretionary functions" for which immunity
is retained under the Governmental Immunity Act.
That case relates to the
arguments set forth in R e s p o n d e n t s Brief at Point II.
2
Lamarr v . Utah State Department of Transportation and Salt Lake
City, Utah Court of Appeals No 910600-CA, decided March 26, 1992, and reported
at 183 UAR 53. That case found that the city owed no duty to the plaintiff to
construct a sidewalk, and relates generally to the argument found at Point I of
R e s p o n d e n t s Brief.
Please advise if counsel can be of any further assistance to the Court.
Very truly y o u r s ,

ALL:mc
Enclosures: Cases
cc:
M. David Eckersley, Esq.

ALLAN/L L ^ S O N

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

Lewis Duncan, individually and
as personal representative of
the Estate of Patrick Duncan,
deceased, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Petitioners,

No. 900233
FILED
April 6, 1992

v.
Union Pacific Railroad Company,
a corporation; State of Utah;
Paul Kleinman; and Does 1
through 100, inclusive,
Defendants and Respondents.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
Attorneys:

Michael A. Katz, Salt Lake City, for Lewis Duncan
and Patrick Duncan
J. Clare Williams, Larry A. Gantenbein, Salt Lake
City, for Union Pacific Railroad and Paul Kleinman
Stephen J. Sorenson, Craig L. Barlow, Allan L.
Larson, Anne Swensen, Salt Lake City, for State of
Utah

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
HQWE, Associate Chief Justice:

We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals*
decision which affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of all defendants. Duncan v. Union Pacific
R.R., 790 P.2d 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
A complete statement of the facts is contained in the
court of appeals' opinion, and we will here briefly restate
the most significant of them. On April 9, 1983, at about 8:50
p.m., an automobile driven by Patrick Duncan containing three
passengers was struck by a Union Pacific freight train. All
four persons in Duncan's car were killed. The accident
occurred in rural Tooele County on Droubay Road, which is
essentially a straight two-lane road running north and south
through the county. The rails traverse Droubay Road at an
angle of slightly over 43 degrees on the north and 136 degrees

on the south. The Duncan car approached the crossing from the
south at the oblique angle of 136 degrees. Three warning
signs were in place at the time of the accident: a railroad
advance warning sign (a circular yellow sign with a large
black X and R) located 305 feet from the crossing, and two on
either side of the road (white cross-bars with "railroad
crossing" printed in black letters) located 19 feet from the
crossing. No active warning device, such as flashing lights
or an automatic gate, was in place. However, nothing
obstructed a motorist's view of the tracks for several
thousand feet.
Plaintiffs brought this wrongful death action on
behalf of the four occupants. The trial court awarded summary
judgment to Union Pacific and its engineer, Paul Kleinman, on
the ground that as a matter of law, they were not negligent
and to the State of Utah on the ground of governmental
immunity. The court of appeals affirmed.
DUTY OF UNION PACIFIC
Plaintiffs assail the court of appeals' decision in
favor of Union Pacific on the basis that the court did not
apply the proper standard of care to the railroad to protect
highway motorists crossing its tracks. Plaintiffs concede
that the State, through its Department of Transportation
(UDOT), not Union Pacific, has the authority to determine at
which crossings automatic warning lights and gates shall be
installed and maintained under Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-14 to
-15.1. However, plaintiffs argue that UDOT's responsibility
under the statute should not relieve Union Pacific from the
duty to petition and urge UDOT to upgrade the adequacy of the
warning signs at dangerous crossings because it is Union
Pacific who is or should be aware of the danger. Plaintiffs
further suggest that in extreme cases a railroad should have
the duty to bring suit to compel UDOT to do so.
The court of appeals properly observed that under our
case law a railroad cannot be held liable for crossing
conditions unless the crossing is "more than ordinarily
hazardous." Duncan v. Union Pacific R.R., 790 P.2d at 598
(citing Bridges v. Union Pacific R.R., 26 Utah 2d 281, 488
P.2d 738 (1971); English v. Southern Pacific Co., 13 Utah 407,
45 P. 47 (1896)). The court of appeals further explained:
In the case of railroad crossings, the
costs of eliminating the hazard, such as by
installing overpasses at all railroad
crossings, including rural ones, does not
warrant a duty of care so rigorous that
simply having a railroad cross a street is
tortious. Rather, for a railroad to be
liable for a crossing mishap, there must be
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something about the railroad's right of way
that creates a hazard to motorists greater
than the hazard presented by the simple
fact that the railroad and the street
intersect*
Duncan, 790 P.2d at 599. In the instant case, the trial court
found that the crossing was not -more than ordinarily
hazardous" because plaintiffs could not demonstrate, or even
suggest, what more Union Pacific could have done to make this
crossing safer, short of installing automatic warning lights
and signs and gates, which admittedly was not its
responsibility.
In English v. Southern Pacific Co., we pointed out
that a crossing might be found to be more than ordinarily
hazardous if it was in a thickly populated portion of a city;
if the view of the tracks was obstructed because of the
railroad itself or because of natural objects; if the crossing
was frequented by heavy traffic so that approaching trains
could not be heard; or if, for any reason, devices employed at
the crossing were rendered inadequate to warn the public of
the danger of an approaching train. English, 13 Utah at
419-20, 45 P. at 50. Recently our court of appeals found a
crossing more than ordinarily hazardous and held the railroad
liable for a crossing accident because it had allowed wild
vegetation on the right-of-way to obscure the vision of
oncoming trains from approaching motorists. Gleave v. Denver
& Rio Grande Western R.R., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The cost of removing the vegetation was minimal compared to
the public benefit of being able to see an approaching train.
Plaintiffs' contention that Union Pacific should have
a duty to petition, urge, and even bring suit against UDOT to
compel it to improve the adequacy of the warning devices at a
crossing is unavailing. Active warning devices are funded 90
percent from federal funds and 10 percent from the entity with
jurisdiction over the highway in question. Federal funding is
generally available only for eight to ten projects in Utah
each year. UDOT has developed and uses a hazard index rating
approved by the Federal Highway Administration as one means of
determining the priority of crossings for upgrading the
adequacy of warning devices presently in place. UDOT's team,
with the railroad and local government representatives, makes
on-site inspections of crossings throughout the state, using
the hazard index. Priorities are then established, based on
the degree of hazard found at the crossings surveyed. In view
of this careful and orderly approach to the safety problem at
crossings, we decline to impose a duty on railroads to
circumvent that process by petitioning, urging, or bringing
suit against UDOT to change the order of its prioritizations.

3

No. 900233

On Utah's roads and highways, there are more than
1,000 railroad crossings which lack active warning devices.
Requiring a railroad to petition UDOT in order to improve the
signage at one crossing without considering whether a greater
hazard exists at other crossings would make little sense. The
Droubay Road crossing had been inspected by UDOT and assigned
a priority rating. Other crossings inspected at that time
were given a higher priority rating because the potential
hazard was thought to be greater than that of the Droubay
crossing. The public is better served by a system such as
that devised by UDOT, which takes into consideration all the
crossings in Utah. We conclude that the court of appeals did
not err in affirming the summary judgment in favor of Union
Pacific.
IMMUNITY OF THE STATE
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment
granted in favor of the State under the authority of its
earlier decision in Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad, 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). That case held
that UDOT was immune from suit in determining the type of
warning devices which should be required at railroad
crossings. The determination of UDOT was held to be the
exercise of a discretionary function for which immunity has
been reserved by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(a). The court,
in turn, relied upon our decision in Velasquez v. Union
Pacific Railroad, 24 Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970), where we
held that the alleged failure of the public service commission
(which at that time had the responsibility now reposed in
UDOT) to require more adequate warning devices at a railroad
crossing involved the exercise of a discretionary function for
which immunity had not been waived, Gleave, 749 P.2d at 669.
In Velasquez, we emphasized the statutory directive to the
public service commission, which was feo prescribe the
installation of "appropriate" safety or other devices, and
held that this language indicated a legislative intent to
confer discretion on the commission in discharging that
statutory duty. 24 Utah 2d at 219, 469 P.2d at 6.
Plaintiffs now contend that Velasquez v. Union
Pacific should be overruled because our later decision in
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980),
narrowed governmental immunity. Plaintiffs urge that UDOT's
decision to defer any improvement in the warning device at the
Droubay Road crossing was an operational rather than a
discretionary decision and that Velasquez has been overruled
sub silentio by three later decisions of this court. We will
consider these contentions in order.
Our decision in Standiford v. Salt Lake City did not
in any way impinge upon our prior decision in Velasquez. In
Standiford, we clarified and narrowed the type of activities
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carried on by governmental entities which could properly be
termed "governmental functions." In the instant case,
plaintiffs do not contend that UDOT's duty to determine the
type of warning devices to be placed at a particular crossing
is not a governmental function. Standiford did not deal with
the further issue of whether, in the exercise of a
governmental function, a particular duty is discretionary or
operational.
Plaintiffs* contention that UDOT's decision to defer
improving the adequacy of warning devices at a crossing is an
operational decision and not a discretionary one must fail.
As pointed out earlier in this opinion, UDOT utilizes a
surveillance team to evaluate the level of the hazards to
motorists at hundreds of crossings where active warning
devices are not in place. This team assigns priorities to
those crossings where the greatest hazards exist. UDOT then
upgrades the warning devices at those crossings with the
highest priority until the limited available funds have been
exhausted. Crossings with a lower priority must await
financing for another year.
Furthermore, UDOT's operation meets the four-step
test for a discretionary function outlined in Little v. Utah
State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah
1983). First, a basic governmental objective is involved—the
promotion of public safety at railroad crossings. Second, the
evaluation of crossings and the assigning of priorities for
upgrading the adequacy of warning devices now in place are
essential to the improvement of public safety. Third, UDOT
exercises "basic policy evaluation, judgment and expertise" in
utilizing a surveillance team to weigh the degree of hazard at
the crossings it inspects and to subsequently assign
priorities to those crossings where the greatest hazard
exists. Fourth, UDOT has the necessary statutory authority to
determine which crossings are most hazardous and most
deserving of the limited funds available for active warning
devices.
The duties of UDOT are not unlike those of the
defendants in Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City, 784
P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), who had the responsibility to determine
the design, capacity, and construction of a drainage system to
carry away flood waters. In that case, we pointed out:
Decisions made by defendants before the
flood regarding the design, capacity, and
construction of their flood control systems
are the result of serious and extensive
policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise
in numerous areas of concern. These areas
would include geological, environmental,
financial, and urban planning and
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developmental concerns, and financial
concerns, just to name a few.
Id. at 463. We reaffirm our holding in Velasquez that the
duties imposed upon UDOT in these particulars are truly
discretionary functions and are therefore protected by
governmental immunity.
Our decisions in Bigelow v. Inaersoll, 618 P.2d 50
(Utah 1980), Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah
1982), and Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985),
have not eroded our holding in Velasquez. In Gleave v.
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, a similar contention
was made but rejected by the court of appeals. 749 P.2d at
669. In Bigelow v. Inoersoll, two automobiles collided at a
highway intersection due to an improperly synchronized
traffic light which allowed the plaintiffs to make a left
turn in front of an oncoming vehicle which also had a green
light. 618 P.2d at 53. Obviously, there was a malfunction
which was completely unintended and unanticipated and did not
result from the exercise of anyone's judgment. In Bowen v.
Riverton City, two automobiles collided at an intersection
because a stop sign had either fallen down or been knocked
down. We held that Riverton City had a nondelegable duty to
maintain its traffic signals in a reasonably safe, visible,
and working condition. 656 P.2d at 437. We remanded the
case for a factual determination of whether Riverton City was
negligent in not responding sooner to notice it had received
that the sign was down, since an earlier response might have
prevented the accident. Again, in that case Riverton City
did not contend that it had any discretion as to whether the
stop sign should be promptly replaced. The city's duty was
clear, and the only question was whether it responded
reasonably once it had notice of the hazard. In Richards v.
Leavitt. suit was brought against a city for negligently
allowing trees, shrubs, and other growth to obscure the
vision of motorists at an intersection and negligently
failing to maintain a stop sign. 716 P.2d at 277. Our
holding in a per curiam decision was simply that the
maintenance of traffic control devices on streets is a
governmental function and the presentation of a timely notice
of claim under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 was mandatory. 716
P.2d at 279. We did not have occasion to reach the question
of what constitutes a discretionary function.
We find no error in the court of appeals' opinion
and sustain its affirmance of the trial court's judgment.
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WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman/ Justice

STEWART, Justice:

(Dissenting)

The Court holds that Union Pacific has no duty to
upgrade the safety devices at a railroad crossing where four
people were killed. The majority overturns 100 years of Utah
case law holding railroads to a duty of care with respect to
crossings without explanation or the slightest acknowledgment
of its existence. The Court attempts to justify its
extraordinary theory that a railroad has no duty to install
adequate warning devices at dangerous crossings on the ground
that the authority to require the upgrading of warning
devices rests solely with the Utah Department of
Transportation ("UDOT"). The Court also holds UDOT immune
from suit. In addition, even though UDOT can require
railroads to upgrade warning signs at unsafe crossings
without an expenditure of state money, the Court holds that
because UDOT lacks sufficient federal funding to upgrade
safety devices at all railroad crossings on its list, UDOT
owed no duty to plaintiffs to require more effective warning
devices. I submit that summary judgment in favor of Union
Pacific and UDOT was wrong, as a matter of law. Accordingly,
I dissent.
I
suit.1

I first address whether UDOT is immune from
The majority holds UDOT immune from suit on the

1. We stated in Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989),
that sound reason and simplicity require analyzing and applying
negligence concepts before deciding issues of sovereign
immunity because such an analysis avoids -having to make
difficult decisions with respect to the difficult discretionary
exception doctrine in sovereign immunity cases. Deciding an
immunity question first may lead to unwarranted assumptions and
confusion about undecided duty problems." Id. at 153.
For the sake of organizational clarity, however, I first
analyze the governmental immunity issue. But my departure here
(Continued on page 8.)
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ground that evaluating and assigning priorities for upgrading
the adequacy of warning devices at railroad crossings is a
discretionary function under Utah Code Ann,
§ 63-30-10(1)(a). Although that proposition may be correct,
the issue in this case is not UDOT's failure to make a
decision to upgrade the warning signals at the Droubay
crossing, but rather, UDOT's failure to implement the
decision it had already made. The majority also ignores the
fundamental mode of analysis for governmental immunity
previously outlined by this Court and thus reaches its
conclusion without following the necessary two-step test as
set forth in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code
Ann, §§ 63-30-1 to -38. See Provo Citv Corp. v. State, 795
P.2d 1120, 1123-24 (Utah 1990); &£&, fL*&^, Bennett v. Bow
Valley Development Corp., 797 P.2d 419, 421-22 (Utah 1990);
Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake Citv Corp.,
784 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Utah 1989); Metropolitan Finance Co. v.
State, 714 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); see also
Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R., 790 P.2d 595, 602-03 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) (Jackson, J., concurring).
As Judge Jackson correctly stated in his concurring
opinion below, before addressing whether § 63-30-10(1)(a)
waives immunity, the court must first determine whether the
activity in question is a governmental function under Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (Supp. 1983). Duncan, 790 P.2d at 602.
Section 63-30-3, as it read at the time plaintiffs' cause of
action arose,2 grants immunity for governmental
(Footnote 1 continued.)
from Ferree is not intended to undermine the policies just
stated. Because I hold below that UDOT does have a duty to
plaintiffs, the sovereign immunity issue must be addressed
anyway.
2. In Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1237
(Utah 1980), we narrowly defined a governmental function as an
activity so unique in nature "that it can only be performed by
a governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of
governmental activity." In 1987, however, the Legislature
enacted § 63-30-2(4)(a), which broadly defines a governmental
function as
any act, failure to act, operation,
function, or undertaking of a governmental
entity whether or not the act, failure to
act, operation, function, or undertaking is
characterized as governmental, proprietary,
a core governmental function, unique to
government, undertaken in a dual capacity,
essential to or not essential to a
government or governmental function, or
could be performed by private enterprise or
private persons.
(Continued on page 9.)
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functions exercised by governmental entities, subject to
exceptions provided elsewhere in the Immunity Act. Thus, the
threshold inquiry in a governmental immunity case is whether
the activity complained of is a governmental function, for if
it is not, there is no immunity- If, however, the activity
is a governmental function, then the court must determine
whether provisions of the Act have waived immunity.
Remarkably, the majority fails to make this
threshold inquiry, but instead assumes, without any analysis,
that the exercise of UDOT's authority in this case is a
governmental function. The majority attempts to justify its
assumption by stating that "plaintiffs do not contend that
UDOT's duty to determine the type of warning devices to be
placed at a particular crossing is not a governmental
function." This statement incorrectly implies that
plaintiffs have failed to raise the issue. The issue before
this Court is whether UDOT is immune from suit, and that
issue can be resolved only after deciding the governmental
function question. The problem is not that plaintiffs failed
to raise the threshold issue, but rather, that the parties,
the lower courts, and the majority have failed to apply the
appropriate legal analysis.3 Moreover, plaintiffs'
(Footnote 2 continued.)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1989).
Although this section appears to overrule Standiford in
that it makes any act by a governmental entity a governmental
function, I have previously observed that the Utah
Constitution imposes limits on the Legislature's authority to
immunize all governmental actions from suit, particularly when
those actions fall clearly outside traditional governmental
activities. In Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d
348, 372 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., concurring), I stated that
the test in Standiford identifies "whe*e the constitutional
right of a person to have a remedy for personal injury begins
under Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution as
against a governmental agency, and where the governmental
right to immunity from such lawsuits stops." However, the
question of the scope of the State's authority to immunize its
own nongovernmental activities need not be reached in this
case because plaintiffs' cause of action arose in 1983, four
years prior to the enactment of § 63-30-2(4)(a) in 1987.
Accordingly, Standiford and its progeny apply to this case.
3. The faulty analysis advanced by the majority and the
parties may be due in part to this Court's decision in
Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad, 469 P.2d 5, 6-7 (Utah
1970), which held that the Public Service Commission's
decision on what type of warning device to install at a
railroad crossing is a discretionary function for which
immunity had not been waived. However, Velasquez did not
address whether the activity was a governmental function,
perhaps because Velasquez was decided before Standiford.
(Continued on page 10.)
9
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erroneous assumption that UDOT's duty in this case is a
governmental function does not excuse this Court from
employing the proper legal analysis.
Applying that analysis clearly shows that UDOT is
not immune from suit, because the activity at issue is not
the exercise of a governmental function. In Standiford v.
Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d 1230, 1236-37 (Utah 1980), this
Court defined a governmental function as an activity which is
"of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a
governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of
governmental activity." In Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
629 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1981), we elaborated on this
definition: "The first part of the Standiford test—activity
of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a
governmental agency—does not refer to what government may
do, but to what government alone must do." (Emphasis in
original.) Thus, the initial issue to be answered in this
case is whether the evaluation, installation, maintenance,
and improvement of safety signals or devices at railroad
crossings is so unique that it is something government alone
must do.
Previously, we have applied the Standiford test to
hold that the following activities are not governmental
functions: the operation of a golf course, Standiford, 605
P.2d at 1237; the maintenance of a sewage system, Thomas v.
Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737, 739 (Utah 1982); the
supervision of the disbursement of escrow funds, Cox v. Utah
Mortgage and Loan Corp., 716 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 1986); and
the maintenance of a water storage tank, Bennett v. Bow
Valley Development Corp.. 797 P.2d 419, 422 (Utah 1990). In
contrast, we have applied Standiford to hold that the
following activities are governmental functions: supervision
of a financial institution, Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627,
631 (Utah 1983); review and approval of a land developer's
plat, Loveland v. Orem Citv Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 775-76 (Utah
1987); licensing of motor vehicles and maintenance of public
records of title and ownership, Metropolitan Finance Co. v.
State, 714 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); and
maintenance and repair of traffic signs on streets, Richards
v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276, 279 (Utah 1985) (per curiam).
In the instant case, UDOT has the statutory duty to
••provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and
improving of automatic and other safety appliances, signals
or devices at grade crossings on public highways or roads
over the tracks of any railroad or street railroad
(Footnote 3 continued.)
Clearly, under post-Standiford cases, Velasquez did not employ
the correct legal analysis.
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corporation in the state."
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1
(Supp. 1983). Statutory authority alone, however, does not
make an activity a governmental function for purposes of
immunity. We noted in Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 P.2d
737, 739 (Utah 1982), that even though the Legislature may
establish an activity as a governmental function for purposes
of the agency's authority to operate, "it does not follow
from this that the function automatically qualifies for
governmental immunity as 'essential to the core of
governmental activity.'" Nor does it follow that statutory
authority makes an activity one that government alone must
perform.
In fact, both the State and the railroads have
historically participated in installing and maintaining
warning devices at crossings. Union Pacific acknowledged
this fact to the trial court in its reply memorandum for
summary judgment, stating, "[T]he Railroad has always
•participated in' and cooperated with UDOT in 'implementing
changes and improvements to railroad crossings' in the
past." Indeed, nearly 100 years ago, this Court expressly
recognized the duty of both the State and the railroad to
provide adequate warning devices at dangerous crossings:
[I]t is clear that, while the statutes of
Utah make some provision for the safety of
the public while crossing tracks when
crossing over the public thoroughfares in
thickly-settled communities or cities, yet
these statutes will not relieve the
railroad company from adopting such other
reasonable measures for the public safety
as common prudence may dictate,
considering the danger, locality, travel,
and surrounding circumstances of the
case. The reason of such rule is founded
in the common law that every one must so
conduct himself and use his own property
as that, under ordinary circumstances, he
will not injure another in any way, if
such injury can reasonably be avoided by
the use of reasonable care. . . . In the
crossing of this particular street, where
the travel is shown to be great, and the
danger in crossing to be greater, we are
of the opinion that reasonable care and
prudence would require that a flagman be
kept constantly at the crossing during the
time that trains continue to cross over
it, or that gates should be erected and
controlled so as to lessen the danger of
injury to passengers and travelers, and
thus lessen the danger caused by the
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almost constant use of the tracks by the
defendants and their trains.
English v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 P. 47, 50 (Utah 1896).
Similarly, in Bridges v. Union Pacific Railroad, 488 P.2d
738, 739 (Utah 1971), we acknowledged a railroad's common law
duty to warn the public of dangerous crossings. Because a
railroad, at least until now, has been held to a duty to
install adequate warning devices at dangerous crossings, it
is hardly realistic to argue that that activity is a function
the State alone must do. The railroad's common law duty in
itself is sufficient to make the placement of adequate
warning devices a nongovernmental function.
This proposition is supported by previous decisions
in which we have held that activities capable of being
performed by nongovernmental entities or individuals are not
governmental functions. In Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642
P.2d 737 (Utah 1982), for example, we held that maintenance
of a sewage system is not a governmental function because it
is not mandatory that a governmental entity collect and
dispose of sewage:
In many rural and recreational areas in our
state, individual homeowners or small
clusters of homes legally provide their own
sewer services with septic tanks. Large
developments having common ownership, such
as condominiums or trailer courts,
currently can and do provide their own
collection and disposal of sewage, subject
to government standards for pollution
control and public health.
Id. at 739. For the same reason, in Bennett v. Bow Valley
Development Corp., 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990), we held that the
operation of a water system was not a governmental function.
We reasoned, "In many areas of our state, residents maintain
wells and provide their own water. Also there are privately
owned companies supplying water to residents." Id. at 422.
The instant case is closely analogous to the
activities at issue in Thomas and Bennett because, even
though government can install safety devices at railroad
crossings, the railroad can and has installed and maintained
such devices. Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-15.1 and
54-4-15.3 (Supp. 1983) clearly allow UDOT to delegate this
function to the railroad, again indicating that this is an
activity a nongovernmental entity can perform.
Since this activity is delegable and can be
performed by an entity other than government, it cannot be a
governmental function under Standiford and Johnson. I would

No. 900233

12

hold, therefore, that UDOT is not immune from suit in this
case.
Nevertheless, even assuming the activity in this
case is a governmental function, the activity is not, as the
majority maintains, a discretionary function for which
immunity has been waived. A decision whether to require an
upgrading of warning signals at a crossing arguably
constitutes a discretionary function; however, plaintiffs'
complaint against UDOT is not that UDOT made the wrong
decision, but rather, that UDOT failed to implement the
decision to upgrade the warning devices at the Droubay
crossing. Policy decisions are generally considered to be
discretionary functions for which immunity has not been
waived. However, this Court has observed mq.re than once that
the implementation of a policy decision is an operational,
not a discretionary, act and, as such, is undeserving of the
discretionary function protection. See, e.g., Doe v.
Arauelles, 716 P.2d 279, 282 (Utah 1985) (duty to implement
policy decision on whether and how to release juvenile
delinquent); Little v. Utah State Division of Family Servs.,
667 P.2d 49, 51-52 (Utah 1983) (failure to properly evaluate
foster home, supervise placement of infant, and protect
infant from harm is a breach of conduct implemental in
nature); Biaelow v. Inaersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 53 (Utah 1980)
(design of traffic control system does not involve the "basic
policy making level"); Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519-20
(Utah 1980) (one-on-one dealings between physician and
patient take place at the implementing/operational level, not
at the policy-making level). In Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d
279 (Utah 1985), a probation officer decided to release
Arguelles, a juvenile offender with a history of sexual
violence toward children, into the community. The officer
conditioned release on Arguelles' attending weekly therapy
sessions, with a professional counsellor. Arguelles attended
only four therapy sessions and three months after his
release, sodomized and stabbed a fourteen-year-old girl. We
noted that the State would be immune from suit for the
probation officer's decision to release the juvenile into the
community because that decision is a discretionary function.
Id. at 282. However, we held that the discretionary function
protection did not extend to the officer's failure to monitor
Arguelles' treatment after release because "[a] decision or
action implementing a preexisting policy is operational in
nature and is undeserving of protection under the
discretionary function exception." Id. at 283.
In this case, UDOT decided to upgrade the warning
signals at the Droubay crossing prior to the decedents'
accident. UDOT's failure to implement that decision goes
beyond the status of a discretionary function deserving of
protection under § 63-30-10(1)(a).
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UDOT defends its failure to implement its decision
on the basis of limited federal funding. It argues that the
decision to delay implementation necessarily involved
discretionary decisions regarding the allocation of limited
resources. This assertion, which the majority facilely
accepts, hides a fundamental fact. This case involves much
more than the allocation of limited resources: UDOT has
other courses of action open to it that do not involve
reliance on federal funding for warning devices.
A review of Title 54 of the Utah Code establishes
that UDOT has a duty to the public to promote public safety
at railroad crossings and that UDOT may delegate that
responsibility to the railroad. Section 54-4-15.1 imposes a
duty on UDOT, "so as to promote the public safety . . . [to]
provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and
improving of automatic and other safety appliances, signals
or devices at grade crossings on public highways . . . ."
However, under section 54-4-15.3, UDOT "shall apportion the
cost of the installation, maintenance, reconstruction or
improvement of any signals or devices described in section
54-4-15.1 between the railroad or street railroad and the
public agency involved." Under this statutory scheme,
therefore, UDOT, in carrying out its obligation to promote
public safety at railroad crossings, clearly could have
required Union Pacific to pay for and install upgraded
signals at the Droubay crossing. In fact, according to Union
Pacific's own statements to the trial court, UDOT has already
delegated the responsibility and expense of maintaining
safety devices exclusively to the railroad.
Since UDOT could have delegated the installation and
expense of warning signals to Union Pacific, UDOT should not
now be able to raise limited resources and lack of funding as
a defense. Such a defense would be clearly unacceptable in
cases where government has a nondelegable duty, such as
repairing sidewalks, Murray v. Qqden City, 548 P.2d 896 (Utah
1976), or maintaining streets, Bowen v. Riverton City, 656
P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1982). If lack of funding should not
excuse governmental action in nondelegable duty cases, it
certainly should not excuse governmental action when the duty
is delegable.
Under the circumstances, a jury could very well find
that UDOT breached its duty to implement the decision to
install warning devices at the Droubay crossing, not because
it failed to allocate funding, but because it did not require
installation of the devices by Union Pacific. I would
therefore remand this case for a trial on whether UDOT was
negligent.

No. 900233

14

II
I turn next to whether the railroad has a duty to
upgrade warning devices at the Droubay crossing.
Contravening nearly 100 years of case law, the majority
essentially holds that UDOT's statutory responsibility to
determine the appropriate warnings to be installed at
crossings absolves Union Pacific's common law duty to install
warning signals at overly hazardous crossings. The majority
bases its holding on the assumption that UDOT's authority in
this area is exclusive. As noted above, that premise is
incorrect.4
The majority observes:
[T]he trial court found that the crossing
was not "more than ordinarily hazardous"
because plaintiffs could not demonstrate,
or even suggest, what more Union Pacific
could have done to make this crossing
safer, short of installing automatic
warning lights and signs and gates, which
admittedly was not its responsibility.
As I have already shown, this Court has traditionally imposed
a common law duty on the railroad to exercise reasonable and
due care, including providing safety devices or flagmen and
sounding bells and whistles at more-than-ordinarily-hazardous
crossings, despite UDOT's statutory authority. See English
v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 P. 47, 50 (Utah 1896); Bridges v.
Union Pacific R.R., 488 P.2d 738, 739 (Utah 1971); see also
Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (Supp. 1983) (locomotives must be
equipped with bells or whistles and must sound them within
eighty rods of each crossing). In fact, Bridges held that a
jury could find a railroad negligent for not taking
additional precautions, such as installing adequate signaling
devices, if the crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous as
a result. Bridges. 488 P.2d at 739. Other jurisdictions
have also placed this duty on railroads. See, e.g. .
Stromquist v. Burlington Northern, Inc.. 444 N.E.2d 1113,
4. Section 54-4-15(2) originally stated, "The [Public
Service] [C]ommission shall have the exclusive power to
determine and prescribe the manner, including the particular
point of crossing, and the terms of installation, operation,
maintenance, use and protection . . . of each crossing of a
public road or highway by a railroad . . . ." Utah Code Ann.
§ 54-4-15(2) (1953) (emphasis added). However, in 1975, the
Legislature deleted the term "exclusive" and changed
"commission" to UDOT. The section now begins, "The department
shall have the power to determine and prescribe . . . ." Utah
Code Ann. § 54-4-15(2) (Supp. 1983).
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1116 (111. Ct. App. 1983) (w [Irrespective of orders or
proceedings of Illinois Commerce Commission, a railroad has
common law duty to provide adequate warning devices at its
railroad crossings."); Central Indiana Ry. v. Anderson
Banking Co, , 247 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind. 1969) (better rule is
majority rule which allows jury to determine whether crossing
was extra hazardous such that railroad has duty to warn
traveling public); Stevens v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 357
N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (if, under all circumstances, grade crossing is extra hazardous, railroad can be
found negligent for its failure to adequately protect the
public from danger by providing warnings and taking safety
precautions in addition to those required by statute).
The majority inexplicably abrogates this
long-standing and well-recognized duty, stating only that
UDOT's statutory authority to determine which crossings
should have automatic warning lights and gates absolves Union
Pacific of any duty. The fact that one party has a duty,
however, does not preclude another party from having a
concurrent duty. I would hold that Union Pacific has a duty
to upgrade warning signals at overly hazardous crossings.
Ill
Since I would hold that both UDOT and Union Pacific
have a duty to install warning devices at overly hazardous
crossings, the final issue to be resolved is whether
plaintiffs raised an issue of material fact regarding whether
the Droubay crossing was overly hazardous. I believe that
plaintiffs have done so. English set forth several
possibilities for more-than-ordinarily-hazardous crossings:
that [the crossing] is in a
thickly-populated portion of-the town or
city; or that the view of the track is
obstructed, either by way of the company
itself or by other objects proper in
themselves, or that the crossing is a
much-traveled one, and the noise of
approaching trains is rendered indistinct,
and the ordinary signals difficult to be
heard, by reason of bustle and confusion
incident to railway or other business; or
by reason of some other such like cause
English, 45 P. at 50.

Bridges further outlined the standard:

To authorize a jury to find negligence
on the part of the railroad in not taking
additional precautions, there must be
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evidence to indicate that the crossing was
more than ordinarily hazardous, i. e.,
there must be something in the
configuration of the land, or in the
construction of the railroad, or in the
structures in the vicinity, or in the
nature or amount of the travel on the
highway, or in other conditions, which
renders the warning employed at the
crossing inadequate to warn the public of
danger.
Bridges, 488 P.2d at 739 (citing Gant v. Chicago & N.W. Rv.,
434 F.2d 1255, 1258 (8th Cir. 1970); English v. Southern Pac.
Co., 45 P. 47 (1896)).
In the instant case, plaintiffs allege that the
crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous because the angle
at which the tracks cross Droubay Road makes it difficult for
a driver to judge the distance and speed at which a train is
approaching the crossing. The majority, the Court of
Appeals, and the trial court all ignored this allegation
because plaintiffs' expert affidavit was apparently based in
part on faulty information. The record, however, contains
additional evidence supporting plaintiffs' allegation. For
example, the accident report of the investigating officer
states that he went to the accident scene on April 14, 1983,
at 1 a.m. and made the following observations:
At night it is harder to estimate speeds.
Parking my vehicle in the travel lane going
North @100 feet from the tracks, I
estimated the speed of the train. At that
angle to the train, it was very difficult
to judge the speed of the train. I
estimated the speed of the train @45 mph
and felt sure I had time to cross the
intersection. On radar stationary, the
train was traveling at 70 mph, I would not
have made it through the intersection if I
had tried.
The record also contains evidence that trains often crossed
at speeds of 70 mph and that four school buses and 580 cars
travelled the crossing every day. Furthermore, the record
clearly shows that prior to the accident, UDOT had determined
that the crossing was sufficiently dangerous to warrant
automatic warning signals and gates, which is strong evidence
that the Droubay crossing is overly hazardous. In sum, these
are all facts which a jury would consider in determining
whether this crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous.
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We have often held that negligence or the lack of
negligence should not be decided on summary judgment except
in the most clear-cut cases. See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d
1170, 1172 (Utah 1983); Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney,
706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985). In the instant case, the
record demonstrates that an issue of fact exists regarding
the hazardousness of the Droubay crossing. Therefore, I
believe plaintiffs should be able to present their case to a
jury.
IV
In conclusion, I believe the majority opinion
incorrectly analyzes this case and grossly misapplies or
ignores our previous decisions. The result unjustly denies
recovery to the plaintiffs in this case and to all future
plaintiffs who find themselves similarly situated. I
therefore cannot join the majority and believe that this case
should be remanded for a trial.

Durham, Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Stewart.
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than a multitude of actions. See Utah Code Ann.
§38-1-8,-13,-14(1988).

I DISSENT:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
Cite as

1. Although the parties refer to section 38-1-11 as
183 Utah Adv. Rep. 53
a statute of limitation, section 38-1-11 is not,
strictly speaking, a statute of limitation. See ProjIN THE
ects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
Co., 798 P.2d 738,751 n.13 (Utah 1990).
2. More recently, in Govert Copier Painting v. Van Nicholas LAMARR,
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1990), this court
Plaintiff and Appellant,
addressed whether plaintiffs action to foreclose his
v.
mechanic's lien was timely under section 38-1-11.
Because the action was not filed within twelve UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
months of the completion of the contract between TRANSPORTATION, and Salt Lake City,
the owner and plaintiff, the court held that the lien
Defendants and Appellees.
was not timely filed. Id. at 173. The court took
pains to note that plaintiff, a painting contractor, No. 910600-CA
entered into a contract directly with the owner and FILED: March 26, 1992
was "not a subcontractor as is often the situation
where painting work is performed." Id. at 172 n. 11.
3. This interpretation is consistent with Utah Code Third District, Salt Lake County
Ann. §38-1-7(1) (Supp. 1991), concerning when a Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
claimant's Hen must be recorded, which speaks not ATTORNEYS:
in terms of when the particular claimant's work is
finished but rather provides that any lien must be Gordon K. Jensen, West Valley City, for
Appellant
recorded "within 80 days after substantial completion of the project or improvement ...." It would be R. Paul Van Dam, Brent Burnett, Roger F.
anomalous to track the timeliness of recordation of
Cutler, and Bruce R. Baird, Salt Lake City,
a subcontractor's lien from completion of the
for Appellees
project, while calculating his year in which to bring
his action from the completion of his own subcon- Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon. .
tract. Indeed, under such a view, it might happen
that the one-year period in which a subcontractor
This opinion is subject to revision before
would be required to bring his action would expire
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
before the start of the 80-day period in which the
subcontractor would be entitled to record his lien.
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
4/Not only does this result serve the statutory prePlaintiff Nicholas Lamarr (Lamarr) appeals
ference recognized in note 5, infra, it also permits a
subcontractor, without jeopardizing his lien rights, from a summary judgment dismissing his
to take a "wait and see" attitude. Nor does it negligence claims against the Utah State
disrupt certain contractual arrangements.
Department of Transportation (UDOT) and
On major projects of long duration, a subcontr- Salt Lake City (the City) arising out of an
actor who completes his work early, such as an accident on the North Temple overpass. We
excavator, need not file his action within twelve affirm.
months after the excavation work was done, at
which time interior plumbing or other work may
FACTS
still be in process. He can honor the general contrOn April 18, 1987, at approximately 10:30
actor's plea to wait just a little longer for payment, p.m., Lamarr was struck by a car while
pending an anticipated construction loan disbursement or additional money brought in by a new walking east across the North Temple overinvestor, without foregoing the right to enforce his pass. The impact threw Lamarr over the side
lien in due course if he remains unpaid. Similarly, a of the overpass, and Lamarr struck the
subcontractor who, by the terms of his subcontract, ground, suffering serious, permanent injuries.
Before the accident, Lamarr had walked
is not entitled to his final payment until the general
contractor receives his final payment, is not required west across the overpass using the pedestrian
to needlessly sue on his lien in situations where there walkway that deposits pedestrians under the
is more than a year between completion of the overpass. Lamarr was frightened and harassed
subcontract work and the general contractor's final by transients who had congregated under the
payment.
overpass. On his return trip, Lamarr walked
5. Neither party has suggested that LSI's motion to
intervene in the existing lien action should be treated along the overpass* roadway. Lamarr claims
differently than a complaint to commence its own this was necessary to avoid harassment and
action. Notwithstanding Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of possible physical violence by the transients
Civil Procedure, which defines an action as being congregated around the stairway leading to the
commenced by filing a complaint, it seems sensible walkway. While walking along the roadway,
for the instant purpose to treat LSI's motion for an automobile struck Lamarr throwing him
intervention as equivalent to the commencement of over the side of the overpass.
its own action, given the preference of the mechanics' lien statute for a single lien proceeding rather
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Lamarr brought suit against UDOT and the
City. Lamarr contends UDOT and the City
were negligent in failing to properly construct,
maintain, and place signs on the overpass.
Lamarr also contends the City negligently
failed to properly "control"1 the transient
population under the overpass". After discovery, the City and UDOT moved for summary
judgment on a number of alternative grounds.
The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of both UDOT and the City.
Lamarr presents four issues on appeal: (1)
did the trial court err in holding the City owed
Lamarr no duty for construction, maintenance, or placing signs on the overpass?; (2) did
the trial court err in holding the City owed
Lamarr no private duty to control the transient population?; (3) did the trial court err in
ruling as a matter of law the City and UDOT
did not proximately cause Lamarr's injuries?;
and (4) did the trial court err in concluding
any duty of the City to control the transient
population is an immune discretionary function, under Utah Code Ann. §63-3010(l)(a) (1989)? UDOT presents two additional
issues on appeal: (1) did Lamarr's failure to
file a notice of his claim with both UDOT and
the attorney general deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction over Lamarr's claims against
UDOT?, and (2) did UDOT owe Lamarr a
duty of care?
Summary judgment is proper when the
record indicates that "there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d 458,
460 (Utah App. 1991). We review the trial
court's grant of summary judgment under a
"correctness" standard. Id. Thus, we accord
no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions underlying its grant of summary judgment. Id.
We first consider whether summary judgment in favor of the City was proper, and
then turn to the grant of summary judgment
in favor of UDOT.
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE
Lamarr raises multiple claims of
Because of our resolution of the duty
however, we need not reach the other
briefed on appeal.2

CITY
error.
issue,
issues

A. Duty Generally
In Utah, a plaintiff must establish four
elements to state a claim of negligence: the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, defendant
breached the duty (negligence), the breach of
the duty was the proximate cause of plaintiffs
injury, and there was in fact injury. Reeves v.
Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah 1991). Establishing the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty of care is "[a]n essential element of a
negligence claim." Owens v. Garfield, 784
P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1989). In fact, the Utah
UTAH
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Supreme Court recently noted that without a
showing of duty, a plaintiff cannot recover.
Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah
1991). "Duty is 'a question of whether the
defendant is under any obligation for the
benefit of a particular plaintiff .... , " Ferree v.
State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989)(quoting
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on
the Law of Torts §30, at 356-57 (W. Keeton
5th ed. 1984)). Whether the defendant owed
the plaintiff a duty of care is "entirely a question of law to be determined by the court." Id.
B. Duty to Maintain Safe Overpass
Lamarr first claims the City owed him a
duty to maintain a sidewalk on the overpass or
to place on the overpass signs that would have
prevented him from walking on the roadway.
Lamarr contends this duty inheres from the
Utah Sidewalk Construction Act, which provides:
The legislature recognizes that
adequate sidewalks and pedestrian
safety devices are essential to the
general welfare of the citizens of the
state. It is the opinion of the legislature that existing sidewalks within
the state, especially in the most
populated areas, are not adequate
to service the walking public with a
result of creating unnecessary
hazards to pedestrian and vehicular
traffic.
Utah Code Ann. §27-14-2 (1989). Section
27-14-2 further states: "It is the intent of
this act to provide a means whereby a portion
of the funds received by the counties and
participating cities as B and C road funds may
be used for the construction of curbs, gutters,
sidewalks and pedestrian safety devices pursuant to the guidelines set forth in this act." Id.
(emphasis added). Lamarr argues this statute
imposes a mandatory duty on the City to
construct a sidewalk on the overpass, even
though Lamarr admits the overpass is a state
road and already has a state-maintained
pedestrian walkway. We disagree.
In construing statutes, we are bound to
"assume that each term of a statute was used
advisedly; and that each should be given an
interpretation and application in accord with
their [sic] usually accepted meaning, unless the
context otherwise requires." Grant v. Utah
State Land Bd., 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d
1035, 1036 (Utah 1971). In Grant, the court
construed a forfeiture statute providing that
the State Land Board "'may reinstate'" a
previously forfeited land sales contract. Id.,
485 P.2d at 1036 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §
65-1-47 (1953)). The plaintiff contended
section 65-1-47 "vest[ed] in him the absolute right to reinstate a forfeited certificate." Id.
The court disagreed, holding the word
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"may" is not mandatory but only permissive. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly rejected
Id.
Lamarr's theory. 4 The specific question of the
Based on the plain meaning of the statute, effect of waiver of immunity on the public
we hold the Utah Sidewalk Construction Act duty doctrine was addressed in Ferree. In
does not place a mandatory duty on the City rejecting a claim similar to Lamarr's, the
to supplement the State's efforts to ensure court stated:
pedestrian safety on state roads. Thus, the
Sovereign immunity, however, is an
City had no duty to maintain or construct a
affirmative defense and conceptusidewalk on the overpass or to place signs on
ally arises subsequent to the questhe overpass that would have prevented
tion of whether there is tort liability
Lamarr from walking across the roadway.
in the first instance. There is sound
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
reason and desirable simplicity in
granting the City summary judgment on this
analyzing and applying negligence
3
duty issue.
concepts before deciding issues of
sovereign immunity....
C. Public Duty Doctrine
"... Conceptually, the question of
Lamarr also claims the City owed him a
the applicability of a statutory
duty to "control" the transient population
immunity does not even arise until
beneath the overpass. The trial court held the
it is determined that a defendant
City did not owe Lamarr such a duty. We
otherwise owes a duty of care to the
agree with the trial court, and hold that under
plaintiff
and thus would be liable in
the public duty doctrine, the City owed no
the absence of such immunity."
duty to Lamarr to "control" transients.
Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152-53 (quoting DaviUnder the public duty doctrine,
dson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197,
[f]or a governmental agency and
201-02, 649 P.2d 894, 896, 185 Cal. Rptr.
its agents to be liable for negligently
252,254(1982)).
caused injury suffered by a member
The Utah Supreme Court recently affirmed
of the public, the plaintiff must
its decision and reasoning in Ferree. In Rollins,
show a breach of a duty owed him
813 P.2d 1556, the estate of a decedent killed
as an individual, not merely the
in an accident with a stolen automobile driven
breach of an obligation owed to the
by a state hospital patient brought a wrongful
general public at large by the govdeath
action against, among others, the State.
ernmental official.
Id. at 1158. The trial court granted the State's
Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151 (citing Obray v. Mal- motion for summary judgment concluding the
mberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 State had no duty to the decedent other than
(1971)). The public duty doctrine has been its duty to the general public. Id. On appeal,
defined as "a duty to all is a duty to none." the court again addressed the question of
Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1165 (Durham, J., conc- whether the legislature's abrogation of immurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, if unity abolished the public duty doctrine. Once
the City owed no duty to Lamarr apart from again answering this question in the negative,
its duty to the general public, Lamarr cannot the court explained:
recover. See Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152.
[T]he legislature's abrogation of
The Utah Supreme Court recently explained
absolute sovereign immunity does
the parameters of Utah's public duty doctrine.
not lead to the conclusion that the
See id. In Ferree, the court applied the public
public duty doctrine has also been
duty doctrine holding state corrections officabrogated. Legislative recognition
ials were not liable when a prison inmate on
of a right to recover from one who
weekend release murdered Dean Ferree. Id. at
has previously been immune from
151-52. The court concluded the officials had
liability for tortious acts cannot
only a general duty to the public, not a private
logically be read as an elimination
duty to Ferree, and therefore owed Ferree no
of the requirement that before one
duty of care. Id. Moreover, in Rollins, 813
can recover damages from another,
P.2d 1156, the court affirmed the trial court's
a tort must be proven. There must
grant of summary judgment because under the
still be proof of a duty owed to the
public duty doctrine, the State did not owe a
one claiming injury and a breach of
duty to protect the decedent from a state
that duty.
hospital patient. Id. at 1161-62. The court
Therefore, in the present case, as
specifically noted the decedent "was simply a
in
any tort case, the proper mode of
member of the public, no more distinguishable
analysis is to first consider whether
to the hospital than to any other person." Id.
there is a legal theory upon which
at 1162.
suit can be brought ... before conLamarr contends "[t]he public duty doctrine
sidering the separate and indepenhas no application where governmental immdent
question of whether the
unity has specifically been waived by statute."
UTAH
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[governmental agency] is immune.
Id. at 1162 n.3 (emphasis added); see also Kirk
v. State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1256 (Utah App.
1989)(to reach immunity issue, court must
assume duty and negligence).
Based on the preceding authority, Lamarr
must establish the City owed him a "special
duty." See Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151. We conclude Lamarr has failed to establish the City
owed him any duty of care beyond that owed
the general public. There is no evidence in the
record the City had any reason to distinguish
Lamarr from the general public. Like the
decedent in Rollins, Lamarr "had not set
himself apart" from the general public such
that any special duty arose between himself
and the City. In fact, there is no evidence the
City had any knowledge whatsoever of either
of Lamarr's trips across the overpass.5
In summary, we hold the City owed Lamarr
no duty of care. Accordingly, the trial court
properly granted summary judgment in favor
of the City.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR UDOT
UDOT moved for summary judgment on
grounds Lamarr failed to file notice of his
claim within one year with both UDOT and
the Utah Attorney General as required by the
waiver provisions of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-3-12
(1989). Although the issue was fully briefed,
the trial court did not reach the notice issue.
Rather, the trial court ruled in favor of UDOT
on its proximate cause claim. On appeal,
UDOT asserts these alternative grounds upon
which we can affirm the trial court's summary
judgment: absence of proper notice, proximate
cause, or duty of care owed to Lamarr.
Because of our resolution of the threshold
notice issue, we do not reach the proximate
cause and duty issues.
A. Notice of Claim is Jurisdictional
Lamarr first claims the notice issue is not
properly before this court. Lamarr asserts the
notice issue is an affirmative defense that was
not pleaded in the answer, and thus Rule 8(c)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure precludes
UDOT from raising it in its summary judgment motion and on appeal. Lamarr notes
UDOT never mentions the term "notice of
claim" in its answer. He further argues UDOT
did not request the court to rule on this issue
on summary judgment and therefore we
cannot consider it on appeal. Lamarr's argument, however, misconstrues the nature of the
statutory notice of claim requirement. Lamarr
erroneously asserts the notice of claim provision is a statute of limitation. Rather, the
supreme court has held the statutory notice
requirement is a jurisdictional requirement and
a precondition to suit. See Madsen v. Borthick,
769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988).
Lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any
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time by any party or the court. Olson v. Salt
Lake City Sen. Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah
1986). Therefore, Lamarr's contention that
the notice issue is not properly before this
court fails. In fact, Rule 12(h)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure requires this court to
dismiss the claim against UDOT if the trial
court lacked jurisdiction.
B. Notice of Claim Under Section 63-30-12
First, Lamarr claims Rule 4(e)(ll) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows him to
effect notice by serving only UDOT, and not
the attorney general. Section 63-30-12,
however, is more specific than Rule 4 in that
the former requires notice on UDOT and the
attorney general. When two statutory provisions appear to conflict, the more specific
provision governs over the more general provision. Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.,
681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984). Thus, section
63-30-12 is the applicable rule at issue, not
Rule 4. To invoke the trial court's jurisdiction
over UDOT, Lamarr was required to comply
with section 63-30-12, the more specific
jurisdictional rule.
Next, Lamarr argues he has "effectively"
complied with section 63-3-12 by serving
notice only on UDOT. Lamarr points out the
attorney general's office had actual notice of
Lamarr's claims within the one-year period.
Thus, Lamarr argues the intent of the statute
was satisfied.
In construing section 60-30-12, the
supreme court has stated: "Section 63-30-12
provides that an action against the State is
barred if the required notice is not filed. It
therefore makes failure to give notice grounds
for dismissal. A plain reading of those sections
indicates that no suit against the State may be
maintained if notice is not given." Madsen,
769 P.2d at 249 (citation omitted)(emphasis
added). The importance of Madsen for
Lamarr's case is the supreme court's application of "[a] plain reading" of section 60-3012. Id. The plain language of section 60-3012 requires notice both to the attorney general
and UDOT, and Lamarr admits he never filed
notice with the attorney general.6
Moreover, the supreme court has indicated
that actual notice cannot cure a failure to
comply with the notice provisions of the
Governmental Immunity Act. In Varoz v.
Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (Utah
1973), the court held a plaintiff's minority did
not excuse failure to comply with a statute
requiring timely notice of a claim against a
county. Id., 506 P.2d at 436.7 Significantly for
the present case, the supreme court held that
the county's actual notice of the claim did not
satisfy the statute:
[f]rom the language of the statute it
is quite clear that the legislature
intended to make the filing of a
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timely notice of claim prerequisite
to maintaining an action.

1. Although we find Lamarr's use of the term
"control" in reference to the City's transient popuActual knowledge of the circulation troublesome, to directly address Lamarr's
claims we repeat that term here.
mstances which resulted in the
2. Lamarr also argues the trial court improperly
death of the plaintiffs mother by
reconsidered the question of the City's duty to
officials of the county does not
Lamarr. Lamarr correctly notes the trial court
dispense with the necessity of filing
denied the City's first motion for summary judga timely claim.
ment asserting the City owed Lamarr no duty of
care. The trial court granted summary judgment
Requiring written notice to both UDOT and
only after the City made a second motion for
the attorney general is consistent with cases
summary judgment. Lamarr claims the trial court's
earlier denial of the City's first motion for summary
interpreting notice statutes similar to section
judgment precluded the trial court from revisiting
60-30-12. For example, Scarborough
v.
the duty issue.
Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah
Lamarr ignores the well-established rule that
1975), involved a companion statute to section
"'[a]ny judge is free to change his or her mind on
63-30-12, section 63-30-13. Section 63the outcome of a case until a decision is formally
30-13 is identical to section 63-30-12
rendered.'" Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constrexcept that the former applies to political
uctors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah App.
subdivisions, whereas the latter applies to state
1988)(quoting Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757,
agencies. In Scarborough, the trial court dis760 (Utah 1985)). "[A] trial court is not inexorably
missed a complaint against Granite School
bound by its own precedents ...." Id. The trial court
is free to reconsider its earlier decision, especially
District because the plaintiff had not filed
when, as here, a party supports a second motion for
notice with the school district and the attorney
summary judgment with additional evidence. This
general. Id. at 481. The supreme court, affirrule has particular application in cases that, like this
ming the dismissal, explained:
one, involve multiple parties and multiple claims. Id.
The School District is a political
at 44 n.5. Therefore, we conclude the trial court
did not err in considering the City's second motion
subdivision of the state. Therefore
for summary judgment.
it would normally be immune from
3. We emphasize our resolution of the duty issue is
suit; and the right to sue is an excfact specific. There is no dispute the overpass is a
eption created by statute. We have
state highway. Thus, any duty of the City to mainconsistently held that where a cause
tain that highway must be a statutory duty, and our
of action is based upon a statute,
analysis focuses on that issue. Our resolution of this
full compliance with its requiremissue in no way addresses the existence or scope of
ents is a condition precedent to the
the City's duty to safely maintain its streets.
Because we hold the City had no duty to constright to maintain a suit.
ruct or place signs on the overpass, we need not
Id. at 482 (footnotes omitted).
reach the issue of whether that duty is a public or
Applying a plain reading, we hold section 63private duty under the public duty doctrine.
30-12 required Lamarr to serve written notice
4. The public duty doctrine is a creature of the
of his claim on both UDOT and the attorney
common law. Lamarr basically argues the legislature
general within one year of his injuries. Lamarr
abrogated the common law doctrine in enacting the
failed to serve the attorney general within the
Governmental Immunity Act. Although the supreme
court in Ferree and Rollins expressly rejects this
specified time, thus depriving the trial court of
argument, we note the legislature could abrogate
jurisdiction over Lamarr's claims against
that common law doctrine if it chose to do so in
UDOT. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
specific terms. Cf. Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d
court's dismissal of Lamarr's claims against
8, 12 (Utah 1991)(legislature has last word with
UDOT.
respect to tort law).
5. This conclusion is also supported by the supreme
III. CONCLUSION
court's decision in Little v. Utah State Division of
We hold the trial court did not err in conFamily Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). In that
cluding as a matter of law that the City owed
case, the court held that once a State agency took
Lamarr no duty of care. Further, we hold
custody of an autistic child and placed the child in a
Lamarr's failure to comply with the notice
foster home, the agency assumed a duty of due care
provision of the Governmental Immunity Act
to the child. Id. at 51. It was only after the agency
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over
had knowledge of the child's condition and assumed
Lamarr's claims against UDOT.
custody of the child, however, that the special relaAccordingly, for the reasons set forth, the
tionship arose between the agency and child. Id.
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
6. Recently, in Kabwasa v. University of Utah, Civ.
N o . 8 9 - C - 4 8 8 G ( D . U t a h J u n e 7,
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding
1990)(Memorandum Decision and Order), Judge
Judge
Green of the United States Court for the District of
Utah interpreted section 63-30-12 to require
WE CONCUR:
notice to both the attorney general and the agency.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
A party brought several claims, including state law
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
claims, against the University of Utah. That party,
however, failed to comply with section 63-30-12
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and gave notice only to the attorney general and not
Cite as
to the University of Utah. The University of Utah
claimed the party's failure to comply with section
183 Utah Adv. Rep. 58
63-30-12 by giving both the University and attorney general notice deprived the court of jurisdicIN THE
tion. Judge Green ruled:
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
The court agrees with the defendants
that the plain meaning of section 63-30Cart W. BARNEY,
12 requires that two notices of claim
Petitioner,
should have been filed by plaintiff: one
v.
to the Attorney General and one to the
Division of Occupational and Professional
University of Utah. Although this statLicensing, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
utory requirement may result in redunState of Utah,
dant notice being given, such redundRespondent.
ancy apparently is mandated by the
statute inasmuch as the Utah Attorney
No. 910755-CA
General is the agent and legal counsel
for all state agencies, including the
FILED: March 26, 1992
University of Utah. In this pendant state
law claim, the court is unwilling to
Original Proceeding in this Court
ignore the unambiguous language of the
ATTORNEYS:
Utah statute requiring two separate
notices, especially where the Utah
Dale E. Stratford, Ogden, for Petitioner
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
R. Paul Van Dam and Melissa M. Hubbell,
strict compliance with the notice of
Salt Lake City, for Respondent
claim provision is essential to maintain a
suit pursuant to the Governmental
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Orme
Immunity Act.
(Law & Motion).
Jd. at 5.
7. We note Varoz was impliedly overruled by the
This opinion is subject to revision before
enactment of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-36
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
(1992)(enacted in 1975 and amended in 1987). That
section provides "the time of [a] disability is not a PER CURIAM:
part of the time limited for the commencement of
the action." Id. In Scott v. School Board of Granite
This case is before the court on respondent
School District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), the court Division of Occupational and Professional
held this section applies to the notice provisions of Licensing*s motion for summary dismissal of
the Governmental Immunity Act. Id. at 748. Thus, the petition for judicial review. We dismiss the
the one-year period for filing notice under section petition for lack of jurisdiction.
63-30-12 is tolled for the duration of any legally
Petitioner is licensed by the Division of
recognized disability. Section 78-12-36, as interpreted by Scorr, however, provides Lamarr no Occupational and Professional Licensing to
support as he has not relied on that section and does administer a health facility pursuant to Utah
not claim a disability prevented him from filing Code Ann. §58-15-1 to-11 (1990). The
notice with the attorney general.
Division is empowered to suspend, revoke or
8. See also Edwards v. Iron County ex rel. Valley place on probation the license of any licensee
View Medical Ctr., 531 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah who "is or has been guilty of unprofessional
1975)(even if county employees had actual knowl- conduct, as defined by statute or rule." Utah
edge of plaintiffs injuries, plaintiff cannot dispense Code Ann. §58-1-15 (Supp. 1991). On
with notice requirement); Lando v. City of Chicago*
128 111. App. 3d 597, 470 N.E.2d 1172, 1175 May 2, 1991, the Division filed its initial pet(1984)(where required notice was defective, actual ition alleging that the petitioner engaged in
notice supplied by third-party (paramedics) did not unprofessional conduct including physically
abusing four patients and administering consatisfy statute).
taminated medicines, both in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §58-15-2(a), and administering
medication without a physician's order, in
violation of Utah Code A n n . §58-110(l)(a) (Supp. 1991). On July 22, 1991, the
Division filed an amended petition alleging
basically the same conduct.
On May 14, 1991, petitioner was found by
the Second Circuit Court to be not guilty of
assault of one of the four patients. On May 7,
1991, charges of "Abuse of a Disabled Adult"
were dismissed. In two separate motions,
petitioner moved to dismiss the Division's
petitions on grounds that the proceeding
constituted double jeopardy under the federal
and state constitutions, and on a claim that
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